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Zoosemiotics in a nutshell 
 
“Zoosemiotics” was introduced in 1963 by Thomas Albert Sebeok, 
initially as a compromise between ethological and semiotic research. 
In the beginning, Sebeok was convinced that “zoosemiotics” had to be 
used mostly as an umbrella term, uniting different scholarly ap-
proaches to animal communication). In the light of its most recent 
developments, a synthetic definition of zoosemiotics can be today that 
of the study of semiosis within and across animal species. 
Let us see the implications of this definition.  
Firstly, the focus of zoosemiotics is not simply communication 
(which is what people normally expect to be the actual goal of 
semiotics), but rather the broader semiosis, that is, following Charles 
Morris (1971: 366), the process in which something is a sign to some 
organism. Communication, the process in which a sign is coded and 
transmitted from a sender to a receiver, is thus to be considered a 
special, and therefore smaller, case of semiosis. 
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By consequence, zoosemiotics is interested in at least three im-
portant semiosic phenomena1. 
a) Signification, occurring when the receiver is the only subject taking 
part in the semiosis, and a true sender is missing. In other words, 
zoosemiotics studies here the way animals make sense out of each 
other, or out of their environment; 
b)  Representation, occurring when the sender is the only semiosic 
subject. In this case, zoosemiotics studies here the way animals 
construct sense and, often but not always, offer it to somebody else; 
and 
c)  Communication, occurring when sender and receiver take both 
part in the semiosic phenomenon, and therefore the above-men-
tioned “sense” (or text) is exchanged, understood or misunder-
stood. 
Secondly. We said that zoosemiotics studies semiosis within and across 
animal species. This means that there is a range of semiosic pheno-
mena that we may call “intraspecific”, and another category that 
should be called “interspecific”. By intraspecific, we mean the kind of 
semiosis occurring within one single animal species (or community, as 
the concept of species is still a bit problematic, to a certain extent), that 
is, within a group of animals that supposedly share a fairly similar 
perception of the world and similar ways to codify it. By interspecific, 
on the other hand, we mean the kind of semiosis occurring between 
different species (or communities), that is, between groups that do not 
share the above-mentioned perception and codification of the world, if 
not to a very basic extent (this latter normally being the very ground 
for establishing a common code — temporary or not). It is a rather 
important distinction, because it implies a (sometimes radical) change 
                                                 
1  
the three terms of the list can be, and are, meant in different ways according to 
scholars and theoretical frameworks. 
See, for instance, Maran 2010: 357. I am using my own definitions here. Any of 
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of methodologies, and an address to a (sometimes radically) different 
order of problems.  
Thirdly, the use of the term “animal species” in our definition is 
the human species as well. This means not only that a part of human 
semiosic behaviour (more or less, what transcends the linguistic 
domain, although we shall see that the notion of language is not 
exactly clear) easily falls under the zoosemiotic domain, as ethology 
had already shown, but also that zoosemiotics investigates a field of 
knowledge that includes both natural and cultural elements, and 
that — ultimately — the critical notion of “culture” is to be considered 
a part of the critical notion of “nature”.  
This is probably one of the most important, and courageous, state-
ments of zoosemiotics, as — among other things — it represents the 
attempt (which by now can be defined fully successful) of extending 
the attention of semiotic research to the realm of the non-human, 
starting exactly from the assumption that a great deal of characteristics 
that we thought were typical of human semiosis, are in fact to be 
widely reconsidered. 
 
Sebeok’s very introduction of zoosemiotics into the scientific world2 
was not the first attempt to study non-human signalling behaviour: 
leaving aside a series of philosophical reflections, as those provided by 
Porphyry, Locke or Hume, it was the impact of Darwin on animal 
studies, and particularly two of his late works, The Descent of Man 
(1871), and The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals (1872), 
that radically changed the scientific perception and conceptualization 
of animal semiosis.  
                                                 
2  “The term zoosemiotics — constructed in an exchange between Rulon Wells 
and me — is proposed for the discipline, within which the science of signs 
intersects with ethology, devoted to the scientific study of signalling behaviour in 
and across animal species” (Sebeok 1963: 465). 
here to be intended as covering the entire Animal Kingdom, that is, 
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Still, Sebeok opened a door that scholars were rather hesitant to 
open. When one compares pre- or non-semiotic definitions of animal 
communication, such as those of Cullen (“Animal communication 
evokes a change of behaviour in another individual”; 1972: 101), or 
Dawkins and Krebs (“Communication occurs when an animal, the 
actor, does something which appears to be the result of selection to 
influence the sense organs of another animal, the reactor, so that the 
actor’s behaviour changes to the advantage of the actor”; 1978: 282), 
with those provided by Sebeok (“the discipline within which the 
science of signs intersects with ethology, devoted to the scientific study 
of signalling behaviour in and across animal species. The basic 
assumption of zoosemiotics is that, in the last analysis, all animals are 
social beings, each species with a characteristic set of communication 
problems to solve”, 1963: 465) and other semioticians, it is clear how, 
thanks to the semiotic approach, animal information exchange could 
finally get rid of the rigid stimulus-reaction scheme and achieve a 
more significant status. 
From that point on, zoosemiotics has enjoyed an increasing popu-
larity among scholars, although, perhaps, not enough to confer it the 
status of an autonomous field within semiotics. The wide range of 
topics covered by zoosemiotics, plus its intrinsically interdisciplinary 
nature, has made this field a rather eclectic one, with incursions in 
several fields of semiotics, including some apparently-strictly anthro-
pological ones.   
 
Following, but also upgrading, the classification suggested in Marti-
nelli (2006: 32–34), at least two main branches should be distinguished 
within zoosemiotics, both to be divided, in turn, into two more sub-
branches. On the one hand, there is zoosemiotics in the traditional 
sense, that is, a discipline dealing with animal semiosis, through the 
most obvious theoretical tools of semiotics. This branch is named 
Ethological Zoosemiotics (EZ). This field can be divided in a chrono-
logical sense, into an early current (eEZ) and a modern one (mEZ). 
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The former refers to the first stage of zoosemiotics, in which there was 
no explicit attempt to develop an autonomous paradigm, but rather to 
use “zoosemiotics” as an umbrella term for gathering different ap-
proaches on animal communication. Also, the emphasis on “commu-
nication”, rather than the broader semiosis, plays a role in defining 
this early stage. In this phase, zoosemiotics is a discipline largely 
relying on the Lorenzian ethological school and on the behaviouristic 
tradition.  
In its modern stage, zoosemiotics achieves a few results: first, it 
operates clearly a transition from having uniquely communication as 
its research target, to including the entire spectrum of semiosis. 
Second, it starts developing a paradigm on its own, trying to propose 
itself as a viable field of inquiry for discussing animal semiosis (and in 
that sense, it sees the appearance of scholars who explicitly adopt this 
paradigm, therefore not leaving Sebeok alone with colleagues from 
other fields). Third, in the majority of the cases, it embraces a cogni-
tive approach, reflecting exactly the type of transition that ethology 
experienced after the appearance of Griffin 1976. Such transformation, 
which goes in the direction of a truly semiotic nature (at least 
according to the traditional definition of “semiotic threshold”, which 
always implies a mental process underlying sign production), eman-
cipates zoosemiotics, as it emancipates ethology, from old mechanistic 
or semi-mechanistic interpretations of animal behaviour (in the Carte-
sian sense), somehow bringing to final completion some of Darwin’s 
early auspices. It is always difficult to locate exact chronological 
records of any historical transition, especially when such a transition is 
the result of organizational demands (as is my proposal of dividing EZ 
into two historical trends). Therefore, we may gladly welcome the 
ethologists’ effort to spot their own transition in Griffin’s work, and 
make it our own as well, thus suggesting that the passage from early to 
modern EZ occurred sometime in the late 1970s. 
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The second branch of zoosemiotics, called anthropological, in short 
anthrozoosemiotics3 (AZ), refers to those studies dealing with the 
semiotic interaction between human beings and other animals, in-
cluding those of cultural and/or sociological type. This branch was 
highly anticipated by Sebeok and by the zoologist Heini Hediger. The 
nature of this interaction has two completely different sides4. 
The first type is called communicational (cAZ). In this context, the 
human-other animal interaction is of a communicative type, that is, 
interactive, reciprocal and — to a certain degree — intentional. Studies 
of applied zoosemiotics, such as human-pets or human-cattle inter-
action, fall under this group, as well as all forms of interspecific com-
munication. In other words, in cAZ, both humans and other animals 
are semiotic agents, and the study focuses on both parties. 
The second sub-category refers to such cases where the non-
human animal is a pure source of meaning, an object, rather than a 
subject, of semiosis. The model is of ecosemiotic type: whereas 
ecosemiotics is in fact the study of human representation of nature, 
this typology of zoosemiotics deals with the human representation of 
other animals. This is evidently the case of myths, tales, allegories, but 
also systematic classifications like taxonomies.  
Now, to be fair, this process corresponds to two different pheno-
mena, signification and representation. On the one hand, the human 
                                                 
3  Two colleagues, one very young, one very famous, noticed that the correct 
shortened formulation should be ‘anthroPOzoosemiotics’. The result, however, is 
hardly an economic improvement from ‘anthropological zoosemiotics’. It may still 
be one word instead of two, but it is so long that one may easily get lost 
somewhere in the middle, maybe exactly around the ‘po’region. This is why, I 
believe, the social scientists who developed the field of ‘anthrozoology’, decided to 
skip that syllable too. We semioticians cannot just afford being practical, can we? 
Not to mention that the same famous scholar is very comfortable in using words 
like “proprioception” (instead of etymologically correct but again endless 
“proprioREception”) in his writings. Maybe he is more flexible with Latin? 
4   They should be three, as a matter of fact, but we shall see that one is almost 
always the natural consequence of another. 
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being perceives the non-human animal in a certain manner, and 
therefore gathers different forms of meaning from it. On the other, 
this step may be (and is, in most of the cases) followed by an action of 
representation, in which this perception is shaped, “packaged” and 
handed over to a receiver (virtual or actual, human or not). These two 
semiosic moments, signification and representation are obviously two 
different steps, and one (signification) may also occur without the 
continuation of the other. However, in the economy of this model 
(which, as I said, includes instances from fictional, scientific to 
everyday discourses), it is very difficult to see cases where signification 
and representation operate independently. The mythic representation 
of, say, the “cunning fox” is always a consequence of a general per-
ception of that animal as possessing that quality. The (representa-
tional) action of gathering a group of animals under one single species 
is always the consequence of the (significational) perception of that 
group as homogeneous under different aspects. 
For this reason, the name for this type of anthrozoosemiotics will 
be significational/representational (srAZ).  
 
Table 1. Classification of zoosemiotics. 
 
ZOOSEMIOTICS
ETHOLOGICAL Z ANTHROPOLOGICAL Z 
Early EZ Modern EZ Communicational 
AZ 
Significational/ 
Representational AZ 
 
 
One obvious observation, regarding this classification (see Table 1), is 
that EZ has a close relationship with natural sciences (starting, ob-
viously, from ethology), while AZ is a closer relative of human sciences 
(especially the so-called anthrozoology) and the social sciences, which 
nowadays show an increasing interest towards animal-related issues. It 
is thus safer than before to say that zoosemiotics 1) is interdisciplinary, 
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and 2) occupies an intermediary position between natural and human 
sciences. 
Another way to treat this classification is Greimasian5. In fact, 
beside a distinction between EZ and AZ, one should also consider the 
transversal condition of zoosemiotic research in terms of empirical or 
theoretical approaches. Once again, as the scientific position of zoo-
semiotics is located somewhere in between biology and humanities, it 
is not difficult to imagine that the methodological approach or re-
search interest of zoosemioticians may vary from the typical biologist 
role of the field scholar to an equally typical philosopher role of the 
speculative thinker.  
Naturally, as it is always the case with these categorizations, diffe-
rences are not clear-cut and the separation of these roles hardly leads 
to a simple dichotomy. Besides a purely empirical approach (that is, a 
direct observation or data collection by the scholar who will eventually 
analyze those data), we should at least take into account a semi-
empirical one, that is, the situation in which the zoosemiotician, 
although not personally collecting his/her data, relies anyway on 
(somebody else’s) professional findings and offers a purely semiotic 
interpretation of them, with the support of analytical tools (software, 
scales, etc.) that normally are part of the field research package. At the 
same time, also the theoretical zoosemiotician’s position is not so 
clearcut. The development of a theoretical model based, again, on 
empirical evidence is clearly a different cup of tea from a mere spe-
culation departing from an abstract intuition. In zoosemiotics, be that 
a strength or a weakness, there seems to be room for this entire range 
of possibilities.  
Summing up, thus, both EZ and AZ may be investigated by an 
empirical or theoretical approach. A schematic representation of these 
                                                 
5  This allows us, among other things, to dismiss the urban legend according to 
which it should be impossible to perform any biosemiotic action within non-
Peircean structuralist schemes. 
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four combinations, exactly because they are not just four but virtually 
endless, is better represented by a Cartesian plan than by the tradi-
tional (for semiotics) Greimasian square (Fig. 1). This way, for 
example, the position of purely empirical research will occupy a place 
much closer to the edge of the empirical-theoretical axis, while the 
semi-empirical one (depending on its degree of empiricism) will 
appear more towards the middle of the same axis. In practice: 
 
 
Empirical Z
 
 
 
EthoZ 
 
 
 
AnthroZ 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical Z
 
Figure 1. The Cartesian plan of zoosemiotics. 
      
 
Presentation of this special issue 
 
The appearance of this special issue of Sign Systems Studies on zoo-
semiotics occurs in a particularly propitious period for the discipline. 
At the time I am writing, two very ambitious publications are shortly 
forthcoming: a collection of historical zoosemiotic articles from 
Mouton de Guyter and the first companion to zoosemiotics from 
Springer. The importance of the aforementioned publishers, let alone 
the publications themselves, testifies of a renewed interest in the field 
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launched by Thomas Sebeok in 1963. The new generation of semioti-
cians, also, is increasingly attracted by the study of animal semiosis, 
and the fact that contributors to this volume like Maran, Tüür and 
Tønnessen were supported by Estonian Science Foundation within a 
project called Dynamical zoosemiotics and animal representations is a 
great sign that zoosemiotics is enjoying a breakthrough at institutional 
level. 
This special issue of Sign Systems Studies is meant to accompany 
the two aforementioned forthcoming publications as a part of an ideal 
trilogy. If the Mouton project is a collection of classics in zoosemiotics 
(including the prehistory of the field, when similar discussions, under 
different labels, were going on in philosophy and natural sciences), 
and if the Springer companion is meant as a critical “status of the art” 
of the discipline6, then this SSS issue is a loud statement from the new 
generation of zoosemioticians7, from those on whom the future of the 
field will depend (or, in fact, depends already), and from some emi-
nent figures from other fields (like Kaplan and Telkänranta). Call it, if 
you like, a Past-Present-Future trilogy.  
New or anyway fresh ideas abound in the essays here collected. The 
authors succeeded in introducing new perspectives and in legitimating 
recently-established ones (anthropological zoosemiotics and zoo-
musicology, to mention just two whose promotion I am personally 
committed to), attempting previously unexplored paths, or redis-
covering some of those that zoosemiotics had left somewhere on the 
way. Among the latter, the fact that scholars from other animal-related 
disciplines agreed to write in a fully semiotic context is to me a very 
                                                 
6  “Critical” is very much a key-word in this enterprise, as that Companion will 
contain specific (personal) remarks on the zoosemiotic paradigm that are not 
necessarily acceptable (and indeed were not, to the chief editors of this journal) in 
more super-partes contexts like the present issue of Sign Systems Studies. 
7  The statement is not necessarily anagraphic, as different ages are anyway 
represented in this issue. 
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encouraging sign of the re-opening of that interdisciplinary dialogue 
that Sebeok had envisioned for zoosemiotics.    
Of course, the articles collected in this issue are far from re-
presenting a unified view of the study of animal semiosis, and per-
sonally I am thankful it is so. There are no schools of zoosemiotics, if 
not in very general sense. As editors of the issue, me and my friend 
and colleague Otto Lehto8 decided to limit our interventions to the 
strictly unavoidable minimum. We do not want to offer the reader the 
perception of a discipline possessing a coherent paradigm. We rather 
prefer displaying a field of inquiry “in search of a coherent paradigm”, 
or even “happy not to possess one”. In that sense, if the reader will find 
a convincing argumentation in favour of a given thesis in a given 
article, s/he shall not be surprised that the next article might bear a 
just-as-convincing position in defence of the opposite thesis. 
My personal impression is that the essays collected in this issue 
show a paradigmatic inclination in the following directions. 
1) An increasing adoption of an ethically-minded approach (testified 
by a good half of the contributions in this issue). When one thinks 
of the establishment and the rapid spreading of such theoretical 
projects as semioethics (proposed by the scholars of Bari Univer-
sity) or existential semiotics (proposed by Eero Tarasti), it becomes 
clear that semiotics has probably emancipated itself from the role 
of a purely descriptive field of inquiry, and it aims at an in-
creasingly relevant prescriptive paradigm. Zoosemiotics seems to 
be willing to follow a similar route, often putting a special emphasis 
on the questions related to animal rights and welfare. A step that I 
personally welcome with great enthusiasm and commitment; 
2) More generally, an attention towards the human-other animal 
relationship, as analyzed through a semiotic interface (what we call 
                                                 
8  I take this opportunity to sincerely thank Otto for a fruitful and smooth 
cooperation on this enterprise. 
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here anthrozoosemiotics). Sayers’ and Telkänranta’s contributions 
to the volume are for instance representative of this attention; 
3) The increasing adoption of cognitive approaches (Lehto’s article 
being the clearest example, in this collection). Most of the current 
generation of semioticians interested in animal semiosis seems to 
agree on the existence of a very active mental life in all animal 
species (each with their own sources and species-specific 
potentials/limitations), that underlies any semiotic action, from the 
most complex to the simplest one (one may easily compare, to 
mention a couple of cases, the works by Timo Maran and Aleksei 
Turovski with a focus on mimicry and comfort behaviour, to 
realise how exactly this approach has been developing). If anything, 
what changes among zoosemioticians is the methodological moti-
vation: for some, this paradigm seems to be the natural conti-
nuation of what is happening already in other animal-related 
studies (ethology being the most relevant case); for others, the 
reason is intrinsically semiotic, and relates to the nowadays clear 
prevalence of Peircean semiotics over the structuralist (semio-
logical, rather than semiotic) tradition; 
4) With all the due difficulties and contradictions, zoosemioticians 
seem to prefer nowadays dealing with the most critical topics 
available in the field, namely those that tend to question the human 
uniqueness in performing certain behavioural patterns or pos-
sessing certain features. Culture, aesthetics, symbolic signalling, 
and — most of all — language, are all traits whose human species-
specificness has been sooner or later questioned from a zoo-
semiotic perspective. In some cases, especially aesthetics9, there 
seem to be no more doubts among semioticians, that categories of 
this type can be if not easily then justly applied to the semiosic 
behaviour of other animal species. In some others, primarily 
                                                 
9  Note the significant representation of zoomusicological articles in this 
collection. 
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language, the question remains open, and the discussion sharp. It is 
to be predicted that in the future, zoosemioticians will focus more 
and more often on these issues, also in the light of the new findings 
coming from empirical sciences; 
5) Little by little, and with no hurries of any sort, zoosemioticians are 
trying to explore paths different from the ones proposed by Sebeok, 
whose shadow is sometimes so big that one could be tempted to 
identify zoosemiotics exclusively with its founder. Although no-
body attempts to deny the great importance that the Hungarian-
born scholar holds in this field, a few cases exist where scholars are 
either following other approaches, or even daring to question some 
of his assumptions as not awfully accurate. To interpret it psycho-
analytically, such occurrence might be a timid yet clear sign of 
emancipation: it is the young kid who turns to an age when s/he 
starts seeing his/her father as not that undisputable hero that s/he 
used to think he was. It is a significant datum, in this collection, 
that about half of the articles are not using Sebeok as a source. We 
will see in the future whether the adult age will bring even more 
departures, or alternatively a (total or partial) restoration of the 
traditional paradigm.   
 
In any case, a firm and neat emancipation of zoosemiotics from other 
fields of semiotics is yet to be achieved. Zoosemioticians are still those 
strange animals that venture either into biosemiotics congresses 
(where they might also feel at home, but it turns out to be a huge 
house that comprises scholars in plants, micro-organisms, genetics, 
fungi, not to mention increasingly fashionable approaches on the 
meaning of life itself), or into human science gatherings where they, 
brave and lonely, try to remind everybody that issues like architecture, 
music, culture, etc. are of zoosemiotic concern too, and that an ana-
lysis on the paintings of the elephant Siri is not semiotically less 
worthwhile than a paper about Van Gogh. Zoosemiotic congresses 
and symposia are being organized here and there, now and again, but 
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we are still far from referring to these events with words like “tra-
dition” or “regularity”. Other than to a lack of people, which is still the 
issue, the problem also seems to be related to a lack of organization. So 
far, zoosemioticians seem to prefer working on their own, rather than 
enhancing and encouraging interaction. When the possibility of 
interaction is envisioned, it is not rare that personal views and egos 
prevail on the necessity of developing a unified paradigm (let alone a 
“school”).  
In particular, the apparent ease with which zoosemioticians accept 
to be identified as just a special case of biosemioticians is rather tricky. 
On the one hand, it is true that being a part of a larger community 
increases the chances of exposure, and — in the specific case — 
contributes to empower the biosemiotic project, therefore, among 
other things, improving a condition from which zoosemiotics itself 
fully benefits from. On the other hand, however, in doing so, zoo-
semioticians encourage a strongly anthropocentric equilibrium within 
semiotics that they (together with all other biosemioticians) should be 
the first to reject and fight against, that is, the implication that all of 
the nature-related fields should be concentrated in one (no matter 
how big) single pot, while all cultural areas of semiotics have a right to 
enjoy a space of their own. When one, for instance, thinks that a single 
human body consists of about 25 trillions cells, a number that is 2,000 
times bigger than the entire human population on this planet (plus, all 
these cells have direct or indirect connections with each other through 
more than one modality), it becomes clear that an area like cyto-
semiotics is at least as entitled as — say — literary semiotics to claim 
exclusive property of some land. 
One may safely say that the big challenge for zoosemiotics, in its 
next future, is the search for an affirmation of its own identity. It is 
certainly a discipline with a robust theoretical (methodological in 
particular) apparatus, but with too few followers who would be con-
vinced that following this path is any more worthwhile (or sometimes 
any different) than the ones proposed by disciplines like ethology or 
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zoology. If biosemiotics, social semiotics, musical semiotics, and 
several other fields were able to convince a fair number of biologists, 
sociologists and musicologists that the semiotic approach does actually 
add something to their own study, ethologists, zoologists, socio-
biologists and other categories have so far found nothing astoundingly 
different or charming in zoosemiotics, if not in a few cases (I always 
like to recall Marc Bekoff’s contribution to the journal Semiotica — 
1975).  
The question is, did these scholars ever have a chance to find it 
out? In other words, how often were zoosemioticians able to expose 
zoosemiotics to colleagues from other fields? The answer, it must be 
feared, is that these occasions were very few, and, among those few, 
most of them did not really help, as they either ended up in strong 
polemics (the most famous instance being Sebeok’s harsh rejection 
towards interspecific communication scholars, despite repeated 
invitations from some of them, like Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, to actually 
visit their centre and see them working), or in that — unfortunately 
not rare — presumptuous attitude of semioticians to consider se-
miotics the ultimate carrier of scientific truth, with the implication 
that the scholars involved in similar topics, but according to different 
frameworks, are merely wasting their time. 
It is, undeniably, a problem. A problem that must be solved first 
inside semiotics (particularly by showing more tolerance for alter-
native paradigms), and then in relation with other fields. This is why, 
as guest-editors of this issue, Lehto and myself are very happy to host a 
varied range of contributions, including some that are not semiotic 
(strictly speaking) and some that are significantly different from the 
paths we personally follow. Dialogue and open-mindness being, pos-
sibly, the key-words.    
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